COMMENTS
THIRD-PARTY RECOVERY FOR INJURY TO ECONOMIC
INTERESTS-A COMMON-LAW PROBLEM IN
INTERPRETING THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Harrisonv. ParamountPictures,Inc.' is the most recent case raising the question of whether an injured third party may sue for treble damages under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. The third-party plaintiff, Mrs. Harrison, was the
lessor of a motion picture theater; the tenant controlled the operation of the
theater and, under the terms of the lease, paid as rental a fixed minimum
amount plus a percentage of the receipts. The tenant had at all times paid the
minimum rental, but his receipts, and thus the amounts paid by him under the
percentage clause, had been kept down due to the trade practices of defendant
motion picture companies, who had refused to permit exhibition of first-run
pictures in the theater. The lessor claimed that defendants had violated the
Clayton Act,2 that she had been damaged in her "business or property" under

the percentage rent arrangement, and that she was therefore entitled to treble
damages. The court, however, denied recovery.3
I
The Harrisoncase is not one of first impression. Three other cases have decided the issue of whether a lessor may maintain a treble damages action when
his tenant has been the direct victim of an antitrust violation. Two of these decisions upheld the lessor's capacity to sue, by denying motions to dismiss. In
East OrangeAmusement Co. v. Vitagraph, Inc., 4 the landlord claimed that antitrust violations had caused his tenant to default in payment of rent, and that
this default led in turn to the landlord's loss of his real estate to a mortgagee.
And in CamrelCo., Inc. v. ParamountFilm DistributingCorp.,' the lessor clalimed
1115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa., 1953).

2 "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor, . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason'able attorney's fee." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1951).
3 Upon trial the jury found no antitrust violation by the defendants. Plaintiff claimed that
the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict, and that, therefore, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be entered for plaintiff. The defendant contended that the verdict
was correct, and that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff had no standing to sue. The opinion
was written on plaintiff's motion. Although the court refused to upset the verdict, it discussed the plaintiff's right of action as if a violation had been found; this note will deal with
the problem upon the same assumption. Appeal in the Harrison case is now pending.
4 CCH Trade Cas. 52,965 (D.C. N.J., 1943).
5 CCH Trade Cas. 57,233 (S.D. N.Y., 1944).
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injury to rental and market value and, in addition, injury under a percentage
rent agreement like that in the Harrisoncase, as a result of the alleged antitrust
violations by the defendant. Neither court gave substantial treatment to the
problem. The Camrel court, after reciting the plaintiff's claims of injury, dismissed the motion, saying only, "I think plaintiff has alleged sufficient to with'
stand a mere formal motion." The third case, Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v.
7
Johns-ManvilleCorp., held, however, that the injuries to the landlord were too
-remote to entitle him to maintain the action. The court dismissed the complaints of one Kuenn, stockholder and creditor of Westmoreland Company, and
of Kuenn, Inc., landlord of Westmoreland, without useful discussion. The,
result in the Harrisoncase, then, evened the split in the cases at two to two.
The Harrisonopinion was the first to deal fully with the problems peculiar
to a suit by a lessor. The court adopted two alternative lines of argument: first,
that a lessor's interest was such that there could be no injury in "his business
or property," as required by the Act; second, that even if there were injury to
business or property within the meaning of the statute, it would be too remote
to be compensable. As to the first contention, it should be observed that Mrs.
Harrison accepted a lower minimum rental, as well as a share of the risks of the
business, in return for expectations of a percentage of the receipts. But in accepting some part of the business risks, she would appear to be entitled to rely
on statutory remedies whose purpose is to reduce such risks. Although, in the
court's words, Mrs. Harrison's expectation of sharing in receipts may have been
'8
no more than a "hope," it would seem to be a hope which should not be impaired, without remedy, by violations of the law. This point had been conceded
by the defendants, who admitted, in their brief, that the plaintiff could have
suffered injury. 9 Moreover, the no "injury in his business or property" argument
appears to be in conflict with the policy implicit in the Supreme Court's deci0
sion in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,Inc.1 -that courts should not deny relief under the Acts where any injury can be proven. The primary issue, then, is
whether the plaintiff's interests can properly be said to be too remote to be
57,326.
F. Supp. 389 (S.D. N.Y., 1939).
S 115 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Pa., 1953).
9Defendants' Brief Contra Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N. 0. V., at 20. They say
[speaking of Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F. 2d 51 (C.A. 9th, 1951)]: "The
but
court granted judgment on the correct ground-not that there was no injury to plaintiffs,antithat the injury was merely incidental, and therefore not within the purview of the
trust laws.
"This, we submit, is the proper basis on which to consider the matter and it must result
in holding that the plaintiff in our case had no status."
10327 U.S. 251 (1946). The court stated that: "in the absence of more precise proof, the
jury could conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' business, and from the evidence
of the decline in prices, profits and values, not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the'plaintiffs.' Ibd., at 264.
6ibid., at
730
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protected; if the remoteness question is decided in the plaintiff's favor, it seems
highly unlikely that any court would then find that the interests injured do not
constitute "business or property."
Lessors have not been the only third-party plaintiffs to bring actions for
treble damages under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Courts have been uniform
12
in denying recovery to shareholders," creditors, and deposed officers of corporations" damaged by antitrust violations. Sales agents, on the other hand,
14
have been permitted to recover lost commissions from the violator. The cases,
however, do not make clear why the interest of a sales agent is considered to be
less remote than those of the other third-party plaintiffs; these courts stress the
existence of an "injury to business," but do not deal with the remoteness problem. However, the divergence in result between the stockholder-creditor cases
and the sales agent cases is not overly disturbing. To permit individual shareholder's suits would be to disregard one of the basic purposes of the corporate
entity. Direct recovery to the individual creditor would give him a preference
over other creditors of the insolventbusiness; such recovery would act to thwart
the policies of the bankruptcy laws. Further, the number of shareholders and
creditors makes the multiplicity of suit problem almost insurmountable. These
elements are not present in the sales agent situation, and may justify the difference in result. But there is no corporate entity, nor is there a serious multiplicity of suit problem in the Harrisoncase; thus it would seem more logical
that the Harrisonresult accord with that of the sales agent cases, rather than
that of cases involving stockholders or creditors.
Thus, neither in terms of logic, dictum, nor uniformity of result have the
cases under the Acts been of assistance in determining the standing to sue of
third-party plaintiffs. Where the important criteria of decision are not disclosed,
they may vary from one case to the next. Judge Kirkpatrick, in his Harrison
opinion, seems to be resigned to this state of affairs, for he says:
It is not possible to formulate any general rule by which to determine what injuries
are too remote to bring a plaintiff within the scope of the Act and I shall not attempt
to do so. Each case must be dealt with on its own facts. All that is decided here is
that this plaintiff's loss, if any, is beyond the limit of injuries cognizable under the
anti-trust laws.'
" E.g., Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F. 2d 959 (S.D. N.Y., 1929); Loeb v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704 (C.A. 3d, 1910).
12
E.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, 183 Fed. 704 (C.A. 3d, 1910).
"3E.g., Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 Fed. 465 (D.C. Mass., 1913).
14 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. 2d 417 (C.A. 7th, 1942); in McWhirter v. Monroe
Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo., 1948), and Klein v. Sales Builders, Inc.,
CCH Trade Cas. 62,600 (N.D. MII., 1950), it was held that sales agents were proper parties
plaintiff; however, judgment on the merits was rendered against the plaintiff when insufficient
proof of injury was made. Klein v. Sales Builders; Inc., CCH Trade Cas. 62,950 (N.D. Ill.,
1951).
15115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa., 1953).
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Apart from the cases, it would seem that assistance in determining the scope
of permissible. plaintiffs might be derived from the policy underlying treble
damages. There are, however, at least three ways of interpreting the treble
damages provisions: first, that in view of the severity of the penalty, the scope
of liability should be narrowed from what it would be at common law; alternatively, that if the policy of the act is so strong as to warrant such a penalty provision, full support of that policy requires the scope to be extended beyond the
.common-law limits; or, finally, that the allowance of the treble damage remedy
should in no way change the effect of the common-law remoteness criteria.
All three viewpoints may be found expressed in decisions under the antitrust laws. The court in Corey v. Independent Ice Co., 6 read the statute as narrowing the common-law remedies. In denying an equitable remedy under the
Act to minority stockholders, the court decided that "neither [plaintiffs] nor
their corporation could claim any right whatever to such damages except so far
as the act has expressly given such a right, and the express provisions of the act
are not of a character such as permits extending them by implication.' 7 On the
other hand, the court sitting in Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co.,'8 allowing an injunction to issue, stated: "I cannot overlook the fact that the federal
anti-trust act is highly remedial. Its apparent object is not to restrict, but to
extend, remedies.... The very penal provisions invoked by defendant's counsel as requiring a strict construction of the act are but evidence of the highly
remedial nature of the statute.... ."' Finally, the court in Loeb v. Eastman
Kodak Co.,2 0 refusing to change the common-law rule denying actions by individual stockholders for wrongs to the corporation, stated: "The statute above
referred to was passed, as we must assume, with full knowledge of the existing
law in that respect. We have no reason to suppose, much less to assume, that it
was intended thereby to run contrary to the settled policy of the law."'"
Far from being an aid in properly interpreting the statute, the treble damages
provisions pose problems of their own. Suppose, in the Harrisoncase, that the
tenant had sued, and recovered treble damages from the defendants. How
should the damages then be apportioned between landlord and tenant? The
landlord might take only compensatory damages, to the extent of her percentage; the lease agreement refers to percentages of "receipts," and it involves
some stretching to bring penalty damages within the meaning of that term.
And it may be argued that the landlord did not bargain for the possibility of
penalty damages and should not be allowed to share in them. On the-other hand,
the lease might be viewed as a risk-sharing arrangement; if the landlord, under
's207 Fed. 459 (D.C. Mass., 1913),
17Ibid., at 461.
I8155 Fed. 869 (C.C. W.D. Mich., 1907).

19Ibid., at 878.
20183 Fed. 704 (C.A. 3d, 1910).
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Ibid., at 709.
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the percentage agreement, assumed some part of the risk of torts against the
business, then she would seem entitled to share fully in any recovery. Moreover,
to limit the lessor to compensatory damages would create a windfall for
the
tenant, who would receive three times his own loss plus twice the amount of the
landlord's loss. From this view, it would seem that the landlord should share
in
the entire recovery.
In summary, neither the cases under the Acts nor discussions of the policy
supporting treble damages are helpful in defining clearly the range of permiss'ble plaintiffs. However, the Harrison case, and the other third-party suits
under the Acts, are but particular instances of a general tort problem-the right
of a third party to sue for any tort committed against one with whom he has
a
contract, when the result is to make that contract less profitable. If a conclusion can be reached on the more general level, as to whether such third-party
plaintiffs have or should have a right of action, the criteria for decision in the
antitrust sphere will almost certainly be clarified.
IE
The Harrisonsituation presents a problem on which two great tort doctrines
bear. The similarity with the Lumley v. GCye situation is apparent; in each, the
plaintiff loses the benefit of a contract due to a wrongful act by the defendant.
In the Harrisoncase, however, the defendants did not know of the plaintiff's
contract, nor did they intend to cause its breach. To allow recovery under
Lumley-Gye theory would involve an extension of that doctrine to cases where
interference with the contractual relationship was not specifically intended; the
courts have been loath to make such an extension.23 Secondly, the Harrison
situation can be viewed as raising a proximate cause question analogous to that
in the Palsgrafcase.2 4 But there is no foreseeability problem in the Harrison
scheme; the plaintiff is usually a foreseeable person, such as a lessor, and recovery would seem to be dictated. Unlike Palsgraf,however, the damage here
is economic rather than physical.s
The leading case in the Harrisonarea is Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint,28 where the general rule was stated-by justice Holmes: "a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another
222 El. & Bl. 216, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 706 (Q.B., 1853).
23
Consult Foreseeability of Third-Party Economic Injuries-A Problem in Analysis,
20
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 283 (1953); Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47
Rev. 873 (1953); Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. Nw. U.L.
728 (1928).
24
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1928).
25
Compare the juxtaposition of Newlin v. New England T. & T. Co., 316 Mass. 234,
54
N.E. 2d 929 (1944) (physical damage), and Stevinson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio
586, 73 N.E. 2d 200 (1946) (damage to economic interests), in Seavey, Keeton, and Law Abs.
Cases on Torts 382, 383 (1950); and consult Foreseeability of Third-Party EconomicThurston,
Injuries
A Problem in Analysis, 20 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 283 (1953).
- 275 U.S. 303 (1927).

THE UNIVERSITY.OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

merely because the injfired person was under contract with that other, unknown
27
to the doer of the wrong.... The law does not spread its protection so far."
The rationale of the rule is the fear of the courts of extending too far liability
for the negligent act. That this is a real problem is graphically illustrated by
Stevinson v. East Ohio Gas Co.;2s there, an explosion caused several factories to
shut down, throwing hundreds out of work, each a potential third-party plaintiff. The court, denying recovery to one of the injured employees, said:
-If one who by his negligence is legally responsible for an explosion or a conflagration should be required to respond in damages not only to those who have sustained personal injuries or physical property damage but also to every one who has
suffered an economic loss, by reason of the explosion or conflagration, we might well be
appalled by the results that would follow.29
Granting that limitation of liability is a valid reason for denying recovery, it
does not follow that this result is appropriate in every third-party action. In
cases where there is no problem of extending defendants' liability, but only of
apportionment of damages between injured parties, the Stevinson rationale is
not applicable, and its rule should not be indiscriminately applied. For example,
where a negligent party inflicts permanent damage upon leased property, the
courts find no difficulty in awarding damages to both the interests involved,
0
that is, to the tenant and to the holder of the reversion." There is no limitation
of liability question here, for the quantum of damages is fixed. The injury to
the land is only so great, and defendant can be forced to pay only that amount;
how the recovery is divided among those with interests in the land is of no consequence to the defendant. This analysis would have allowed recovery in the
Harrisoncase, for the problem in a percentage-of-profits lease is not essentially
different. The antitrust violation has decreased the receipts of the enterprise
3
by an amount which, under the theory of the Act, must be ascertainable. The
27
TIbid., at 309. The rule is also stated in 1 Sutherland, Damages § 33 (4th ed., 1916):
"Where the plaintiff is injured by the defendant's conduct to a third person it is too remote if
he sustains no other than a contract relation to such third person, or is under contract obligation onhis account, and the injury consists only in impairing the ability or inclination of such
third person to perform his part, or in increasing the plaintiff's expense or labor of fulfilling
such contract, unless the wrongful act is wilful for that purpose."
One exception to this rule denying third-party recovery is the master-servant cases, where
masters have traditionally been able to recover for wrongful injuries to servants. This doctrine, however, has been narrowly applied. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301
(1947); United States v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 64 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. N.C., 1946).
Contra: Attorney-General v. Valle-Jones [1935] 2 K.B. 209.
29Ibid., at 592 and 203.
47 Ohio Law Abs. 586, 73 N.E. 2d 200 (1946).
28s
30"It is well settled that both the tenant and landlord may maintain actions for injuries
done to the soil, or buildings upon it. They are both injured, but in different degrees; the tenant inthe interruption to his estate and the diminution of his profits, and the landlord in
the more permanent injury to his property. Both may have separate actions for their several
damages, and a recovery is to be had according to their respective interests." George v. Fiske,
32 N.H. 32, 45 (1855).
3 Consult note 10 supra.
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tenant may recover damages for these lost profits. Upon such recovery, Mrs.
Harrison would be entitled to her percentage of the damages awarded in place
of the lost receipts. And allowing Mrs. Harrison to recover directly would not
increase the defendant's total liability beyond the amount recoverable by the
lessee.
However, the rule of the Robins Dry Dock case has been of such pervasive influence that courts have seldom distinguished those third-party cases where recovery would extend the tortfeasor's liability from those where it would not.
But there is at least one group of cases which have, to some degree, rejected the
Robins rule. These cases concern fishing expeditions where it is the practice for
the crew to be paid by sharing in the catch, along with the owners of the boats.
The Ninth Circuit, in the recent case of Carbone v. Ursick,3 2 held that fishermen
employed under such a contract could recover, in their own names, from one
who had negligently fouled the boat's nets. This decision expressly overruled a
prior decision of the Ninth Circuit denying recovery on the basis of the Robins
DryDock case. 3 A Federal district court in Lind v. United States,3 4 a case where
the masters of both ships were found to be negligent, held the owner of each ship
liable to the crew members of the fishing vessel for full damages. These courts,
seeing no problem of extending the tortfeasor's liability, allowed a right of action
to the crew although the "direct" tort was against the owner, thus making
whole, directly, all parties injured." But even in the confines of the "fishingboat" cases, there are strong holdings following the traditional rule of no
36
recovery.
Suits by insurers in their own name to recover money paid in satisfaction of
tort claims constitute an important instance of denial of third-party recovery
despite the absence, in many cases, of a limitation of liability problem. The
analogy between this problem and that of the Harrisbncase is close. As has been
noted, a percentage-of-profits lessor, much like an insurer, contracts to assume
certain risks of the business, among which may be that of reduced profits resulting from tortious acts of others. The common-law rule would deny recovery to the insurer, as to the lessor. However, in some cases the doctrine of
subrogation may be available to permit recovery by the insurer; no similar
doctrine is present to assist the lessor.
Rockingham Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Bosher 7 is illustrative of the group of
32209

F. 2d 178 (C.A. 9th, 1953).

33 Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F. 2d 392 (C.A. 9th, 1951).
34 61 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. N.Y., 1945).
36 Cf. The Mary Steele, 2 Low. 37, 16 Fed. Cas. 1003, No. 9,226 (D. Mass., 1874); The
Columbia, 9 Ben. 254,6 Fed. Cas. 173, No. 3,035 (E.D. N.Y., 1877).
35Baxter v. Rodman, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 435 (1826); Grozier v. Atwood, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 234
(1826); Taber v. Jenny, 1 Spr. 315, 23 Fed. Cas. 605, No. 13,720 (D. Mass., 1856).
37 39

Me. 253 (1855).
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5
cases in which the insurer is without subrogation. The defendant wilfully
burned the property of the insured. The plaintiff insurance company paid on the
policy, but was denied a cause of action in its own name. Because the amount
of damage caused by fire in cases of this nature can be readily computed, this
is the clearest situation in which the courts' fear of unduly extending liability
is groundless. In the usual case of property damage, subrogation is now allowed.
But subrogation is available in only a limited number of cases. It appears to
39
be the law that there can be no subrogation in part. Thus, if the amount of the
policy is less than the amount of the loss, the insurer is entirely dependent upon
the insured for his recovery from the tortfeasor. The reason for this rule is
probably fear that the wrongdoer, as a result of a single negligent tort, might be
well, perhaps,
subjected to a multiplicity of suits by insurance companies, as
4
as one by the insured for any loss not covered by the policies. 1
41
Neither is subrogation available in life or accident insurance cases. These
than
other
policies are seen as compensating the injured party for something
an
for
be
may
that for which he recovers from the tortfeasor, in that the policy
4There
insured.
amount greater than that recoverable as tort damages by the
are some instances in which this argument is valid; thus, if a man has a large
life insurance policy, it might be that this amount would be beyond the "actual" value of his life, and that it would be unfair to a defendant to make him
pay this amount to an insurance company for being so unlucky as to have
negligently killed an "overinsured" man. However, it seems clear that very
often the amount of the policy will be no more than the tort damages recoverable by the insured. In such a case, recovery by the insurer would involve no
extension of the defendant's liability.
Subrogation, then, is not allowed when the defendant's liability may be extended. But when the amount of the insurance cannot exceed the tort damages
recoverable by the insured, courts have surmounted the remoteness problem,
43
and permitted recovery by the third-party insurer. However, it is highly un38 Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y'
& N.H.R . Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 290 (1846); Town of
Milton v. Story, 11 Vt. 101 (1839).
31Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. v. Standard Oil Co., 59 Fed. 984 (C.A. 8th, 1894); Fairgruve v. Marine Ins. Co. of London, 94 Fed. 686 (C.A. 8th, 1899); National Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 4 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Ky., 1933); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hannibal
& St. J. R. Co., 3 Dill. 1, 1 Fed. Cas. 207, No. 96 (C.C.E.D. Mo., 1874); Vance, Insurance
§ 134 (3d ed., 1951).
40But see the explanation offered in Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. v. Standard Oil Co., 59
Fed. 984 (C.A. 8th, 1894).
41Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Crab Orchard Imp. Co. v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry. Co., 115 F. 2d 277 (C.A. 4th, 1940); Suttles v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 156 App. Div.
435,141 N.Y. Supp. 1024 (4th Dep't, 1913). But cf. Staples v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 62
F. 2d 650 (C.A. 10th, 1932); Vance, Insurance § 134 (3d ed., 1951).
42Compare Vance, Insurance § 134 (3d ed., 1951).
4In
the case of property insurance, the amount of the policy clearly can never exceed
the value of the property. Apparently, the right of subrogation exists even in the absence of a
contract providing for it. Consult Vance, Insurance § 134 (3d ed., 1951).
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likely that any court would apply subrogation doctrine literally in the Harrison
situation, although the central elements for its application are there present.
First, there is, as has been noted, a single fixed amount of damages, beyond
which the defendant's liability cannot be carried. Secondly, there has been a
paying out by the lessor. Mrs. Harrison, in bargaining for the percentage arrangement, undoubtedly accepted a lower minimum rental than she would have
otherwise. Thus, to that extent, the tenant has not been injured by the reduction
of his receipts. If subrogation were here applicable, the lessor would have a
cause of action, in her own name, for her share of the lost profits. 44
Although the Robins Dry Dock case established the general rule denying recovery, the case itself is one where the defendant's liability was clearly limited,
and in which the only real problem was one of apportionment. Defendant had
negligently damaged a ship, so that it was not available for the use of the
plaintiff charterer at the time specified in his contract with the owner. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, allowing recovery, pointed out that "the result reached involves no injustice to respondent. Its liability for its tortious act
is for the actual damages done to the combined interests in the ship. The
measure of total recovery is the market value of the loss [of the use] of the
ship. '45 Under the theory of the Second Circuit, if the vessel were off hire when
damaged, as in the case, the owner recovers for the lost charter hire, and the
charterer receives the balance, that is, the difference between the charter hire
and the market value of the use. In the usual case, where the ship is not off hire,
the charterer would recover the entire amount. However, although the loss is
at least in part the charterer's, Justice Holmes could find no protection in the
law for such a plaintiff.
The previous discussion points towards the conclusion that there exists a
distinguishable body of cases in which third-party recovery has in the past been
denied on limitation of liability grounds, but to which the argument is not
properly applicable. Where the amount of the tortfeasor's liability is fixed and
ascertainable, and where more than one interest is injured, it appears unreasonable to make contingent the recovery of some of the parties, forcing them to
rely upon the party directly injured for relief. This is not to deny that there are
cases where the fear of extending too far the defendant's liability is valid; the
Stevinson case, with its numerous prospective plaintiffs, is argument enough. 4"
But the courts have failed to differentiate between those cases in which extension of liability would raise formidable questions and those in which it would
not.
44One important consideration not present in the Harrison case, but present in the insurance situation, is the question of whether, due to the superior risk-sharing capabilities of an
insurer, policy might not dictate a denial of his right of action against the tortfeasor. James,
Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 537 (1952); Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 241 (1949).
45
Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F. 2d 3, 5 (C.A. 2d, 1926).
46 See discussion at note 28 supra.
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The line of distinction will not be a perfectly smooth one. There will often be
a problem as to whether the particular case is one in which the defendant's liability is static, in which suit by one or several plaintiffs will not increase the
47
amount of damages to be paid out. In Cattle v. Stockton Water Works, for example, the third-party plaintiff, a contractor, lost the benefit of his bargain with
the party directly injured, as a result of the defendant's negligence. Recovery
was denied. It seems clear that had the tort caused the intermediate party to
-lose the benefit of his bargain with the third party, recovery would be available
the
to him, although he could not recover for the third party's loss. To allow
48
third party to obtain recovery would extend the tortfeasor's liability.

Workmen's compensation insurance cases present another instance in which
it may be difficult to determine whether third-party recovery would extend lia49
bility. For example, in Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, defendant
negligently killed one of plaintiff's employees; as a result, plaintiff was forced
to pay increased amounts for workmen's compensation insurance. Recovery for
the amount of the increase was denied. It appears, at first sight, that the position of the employer is similar to that of an insurer, and that recovery would be
desirable. This situation, however, involves four parties, the insurer being the
other party injured by the tort. Recovery by the insurer up to the amount of
tort damages recoverable would not extend liability, but if, in addition, the
employer could recover for his increased premiums, the amount of the tortfeasor's liability would be increased.
. Several questions remain unanswered. First, why is it not sufficient to let the
party directly injured bring the suit, and let the third party get relief through
him? Surely, in the usual case, it is in the interest of the directly injured party
to bring action. And the courts have undoubtedly relied upon the intermediate
party to seek relief on behalf of the injured third party, in denying the third
party's capacity to sue. Nevertheless, there are cases where it is to the best interests of the intermediate party not to sue. The bringing of an action might
jeopardize important business relationships. The intermediate party's share of
the recovery might be very small, or the entire loss might be the third party's.
Thus the interests of the two parties need not coincide; it seems clear that if
her tenant had sought recovery, Mrs. Harrison's suit would have been
unnecessary 5
47 [1875] 10 Q.B. 453. The facts are: the defendant negligently flooded some land at a time
when plaintiff, a contractor, was doing work there for the owner; as a result, plaintiff was
delayed in his work, and put to increased expense; he sued to recover his increased expense.
48 It will be recalled that the lessor-plaintiffs in the antitrust cases claimed as injury the
of
decrease in market value of their real estate as a result of the tenant's unsuccessful period
operation. In view of the fact that the tenant could not recover for this decrease in value,
recovery by the lessor would result in extension of the defendant's liability.
4' 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371, 92 A.L.R. 1201 (1934).
If
50The possibility of insolvency of the intermediate party raises additional difficulties.
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the insolvent. On the other hand, to allow the third party to recover directly would
give him a preference over creditors. This result is not necessarily desirable.
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Another major problem is that of control of settlements. If reliance is placed
upon the action of the intermediate party, he may settle for an insufficient
amount. In the Robins Dry Dock case, the owner settled for an amount which
exceeded his own loss, but did not cover that of the charterer. If the third party
is foreclosed by such an agreement, the door is open for collusive settlements.
On the other hand, if the intermediate party may settle only as to his own claim,
and third parties retain an independent claim, settlements will be made more
difficult, for defendants will fear that there may be some hidden third party
whose claim is not being settled.
A final objection is that a direct third-party cause of action might require the
tortfeasor to defend against multiple actions. But in many cases the actions
will be joined; moreover, the common situation is where there will be only two
plaintiffs, as in the Harrison case. In any event, the third party is innocent; the
defendant is not.
Although direct third-party recovery has been found to be desirable in certain cases, the weight of precedent is opposed to it. Most of the cases involving
injury to the economic interests of third parties have been disposed of on
grounds of remoteness, and discussion has ended there. But further analysis has
disclosed that this class of third-party actions is not uniform-that although
some recoveries would extend liability, others would not. The distinction proposed would achieve the advantageous result of permitting third-party recovery .
where this is possible without increasing the amount of damages payable by the
tortfeasor. In the absence of a discernible supervening policy, this distinction
seems as appropriate to antitrust actions as to others.

JUDICIAL EXERCISE OF EQUITABLE DISCRETION IN
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CONTRACTS
A quarter of a century of experience with federal and state arbitration
statutes has suggested to some observers that arbitration, despite its great
usefulness in many situations, does not always achieve better results than could
the courts. Many judges, brought into contact with arbitration contracts by
virtue of statutory provisions for enforcement and review, have demonstrated
their agreement with this evaluation. This attitude is most apparent in their frequent refusal to enforce such contracts at the outset of the arbitration process
in cases in which they have felt more equitable results would be achieved
through judicial procedures.
Opportunities for judicial influence over the outcome of arbitrable disputes
are presented not only in review of arbitrator's decisions but at the several
points at which statutes provide for judicial action before arbitration commences. A court may be asked to issue an order directly compelling the parties
to arbitrate, to stay judicial proceedings where under the terms of the contract

